The purpose of this study is to investigate the wide diversity in financing of publicly traded restaurant firms in the United States. Fisher discriminant functions were estimated and firm features differentiating light debt users from heavy debt users were identified and analyzed. The study has found that managerial control is the most important contributor to the diversity in debt use in the restaurant industry. Size and type of operation also explain the diversity. The analysis shows that small full-senice restaurant firms with low managerial ownership tend to use less debt, while large economy/buffet or fast-food restaurant firms under tight managerial control are likely to be heavy debt users.
Introduction
Capital structure is the composition of a firm's financing sources. Essentially, it is the mix of debt and equity. Capital structure has been a controversial topic in corporate finance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) propose the irrelevance of capital structure to firm value under some strict assumptions of a perfect capital market. However, with the assumptions relaxed, the no-tax and no-bankruptcy assumptions in particular, capital structure does matter in f i r m valuation and an optimal capital structure is possible (Baxter, 1967; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; DeAngelo & Masulis, 1980; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Weston & Brigham, 1990) . Moyer, McGuigan, and KTetlow (1990) point out that capital structure may affect the market value of a firm. While the tax shield of debt increases firm value, bankruptcy and agency costs offset the benefits of debt. A change in capital structure may change the firm's tax shield, bankruptcy, and agency costs and hence its value. Capital structure decision is one of the centrally important decisions that face the management of a hospitality firm. Optimizing capital structure, as Andrew and Schmidgall (1993) point out, is essential to the long-run success of the hospitality firm.
The factors that determine capital structure have been well debated in finance literature. In hospitality research, however, capital structure has been insufficiently discussed. While several studies have explored the capital structure determinants of hotels (Kwansa, Johnson, & Olsen, 1987; Sheel, 1994) , there is a lack of academic research on the capital structure of restaurant firms. In the restaurant industry, during the 1989-1991 recession in the United States, excessive debt use aggravated the financial hardship caused by sluggish sales. Many restaurants went bankrupt. Wood (1992) points out that many restaurant firms that had been able to borrow in the past may have eventually reached a jundure at which selling stocks became necessary. Capital structure has become a more important issue for the industry.
I
Within the restaurant industry observed capital structures differ substantially across t firms. While some restaurant firms use little debt, some are deeply indebted. At the end of 1993, among the 75 public restaurant companies recorded in COMPUSTAT, the debt ratio, which is the ratio of debt to total assets, ranged from 6.82% to 145.2%. Two firms had debt ratios greater than one, due to excessive borrowing and cumulative operation losses. What factors have caused such a wide diversity in debt use within the restaurant industry? This study is designed to explain the financing diversity in the restaurant industry. In particular, it focuses on those firms heavily indebted versus those using little or no debt. The study attempts to identify factors that may discriminate between heavy debt users and light debt users. These factors, if identified, may provide an explanation to the diverse financing behaviors in the restaurant industry.
Background
In finance literature, commonly discussed capital structure determinants include assets structure, business risk, growth, size, profitability, and managerial control (Weston & Brigham, 1990) . Myers (1984) suggests that profitable firms should have less cumulative need for external financing and that profitable firms in slow-growth industries should have low debt ratios. Titman and Wessels (1988) propose that large diversified firms tend to use more debt and profitable firms tend to use less debt. Scott (1972) concludes that industry, as a proxy of business risk, should have an influence on the capital structure. Business risk affects a firm's tolerance of financial risk and hence its financing policy. The effect of managerial control on capital structure is more complicated. According to Weston and Brigham (1990) , when the management has voting control, it may choose to use more debt to avoid diluting the control. Its financing preference, however, may switch to new equity when the firm is financially weak and is facing default risk.
Empirically Scott and Martin (1975) found that capital structure differed across industries and that large firms used more debt than small firms. In Gupta's (1969) regression analysis, growth companies were found to have higher debt to assets ratios. In a cross-nation regression analysis, Toy Stonehill, Remmers, Wright, and Beekhuisen (1974) found that growth was positively related to debt ratio and that profitability had a negative impact on corporate debt use. The multivariate regression analysis by Titman and Wessels (1988) found that profitability led to lower debt leverage, but the impact of growth on debt use was insighcant. Friend and Lang (1988) found that debt ratios of publicly held firms increased with the fraction of stocks owned by managerial insiders.
Previous empirical studies on capital structure have focused on large firms in manufacturing industries. Few empirical studies on capital structure have been documented in hospitality research. Kwansa, Johnson, and Olsen (1987) found no significant relationship between sample hotels' debt /equity ratios and all the explanatory variables including growth, profitability, and size in their across-firm model. On the other hand, in Sheel's (1994) regression model, which used samples of hotel firms and manufacturing firms, all independent variables, including size, profitability, and operating risk, were significantly related to the debt to assets ratio. In a comparative study on financial ratios of different types of restaurant firms, Gu and McCool(1993/1994) found sighcant differences in debt ratios across different types of restaurant firms. Their study however, did not investigate the factors that had caused the difference. An investigation of the causes of the financing diversity in the restaurant industry4 nonmanufacturing industry mainly composed of small firms-will not only enhance a weak link in hospitality research but also enrich the empirical literature on capital structure in general.
Methodology
Most of the previous empirical studies on capital structure, including the two on the hotel industry's capital structure, used linear regression models to examine the relationship between debt use and a variety of factors. Many studies failed to find a linear relationship between debt use and some or all of the factors. The nonexistence of a linear relationship, however, does not necessarily mean that there is no relationship between debt use and those factors. Furthennore, a critical assumption of regression is the normality of data. Business data, however, are often strongly skewed (Summer & Peters, 1974) . With severe data non-normality present, linear regression may lose its robustness and regression results can be distorted (Kleinbaum, Kupper, & Muller, 1988) .
Different from previous empirical studies, this study uses the multivariate Fisher discriminant function (Fisher, 1936) to identify and analyze the variables that distinguish light-debt restaurant firms from heavy-debt restaurant firms. The Fisher function does not have to make any distributional assumptions. Research has shown that although dummy variables do not follow a normal distribution, their use in Fisher discriminant functions can help improve the classification (Afifi & Clark, 1984) . Goldstein and Dillon (1978) illustrate the use of discrete variables in discriminant models. In this study if the two groups of restaurant firms a-found to have some distinct features that distinguish them from each other, these features may be the relevant factors that affect their financing decisions and may explain the wide financing diversity in the industry. Whether debt use is linearly related to the factors is unimportant and is not the interest of the study.
The Fisher discriminant function for classifying restaurant firms into heavy and light debt users is denoted as:
where Z is a linear combination of all dassifylng variables or features-XI through &. The value of the dividing point of the two groups is calculated as:
where 2, is the mean Zvalue of the light-debt group and % the mean Z value of the heavy-debt group. After the coefficients, a through g, are estimated and the discriminant function is established, the Z value of any restaurant firm can be calculated and compared with the dividing point C. The classification depends on whether the Zvalue is greater or The features of a restaurant firm with a DR of 0.57 may not be very different from those of a restaurant firm with a DR of 0.55. This study is more interested in those firms with wide difference in debt use in the industry-those heavily relying on debt and those using little or no debt-and their distinct features. Therefore, it further sorted out firms with debt exceeding two-thirds of the financing (DR > 0.67) as heavy debt users (12 firms) and those with debt less than one-third of total financing (DR c 0.33) as light debt users (32 firms). A second Fisher discriminant function was estimated for the 44-firm sample. Table 1 provides a list of the sample restaurant firms and their classifications. Table 2 shows the types of the restaurant firms under different classifications.
The operation types of restaurant firms served as a proxy for business risk. The Sample restaurant firms were divided into four categories of operations: full-service upscale, full-service family, economy/buffet, and fast-food. Operation types were determined based on descriptions in the COMPACT DISCLOSURE and confirmed by phone calls to companies when descriptions were vague. Three dummy variables, TI, T2, and T3, were used to represent full-service upscale, full-service family and economy/buffet operations respectively. Fast-food restaurant firms were assigned zero value for all the three dummy variables.
In investigating the relationship between debt use and profitability, previous studies used operating profits or earnings before interest and taxes as the profitability variable (Toy et al., 1974; Titman & Wessels, 1988) . In reality, many firms use operation-generated cash flow as an internal financing source to substitute for debt. Therefore, this study used the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets (OCF) as the profitability variable. OCF was lagged for a year, as a firm's financing deasion was likely to be affected by its previous operating results. Total assets (TA) and percentage of managerial ownership (MC) were used as size and managerial control variables. The growth variable (G) was represented by the three-year growth of sales (1991) (1992) (1993) .
The nondurnmy independent variables were checked for normality in normal probability plots. While OCF and MC appeared normal, strong skewness was observed in the distributions of G (with a mean of 0.254 and a median of 0.119) and TA (with a mean of $347 million and a median of $75.9 million). The non-normality of the data justified the use of discriminant analysis. Table 3 and Table 4 t-tests on their differences.
Estimated Fisher Models
Statistical program SAS was used for estimating Fisher discriminant models. Discriminant stepwise procedure was employed for selecting the variables that could contribute to the differentiation of the two groups. Statistical signhcance levels for a variable to enter the model (F-to enter) and to be removed from the model (F-to remove) were set at a = 0.15, as suggested by Afifi and Qark (1984) . Therefore, variables with p values less than 0.15 would be retained. The p value under each variable indicates the significance level of its marginal contribution to the classification. Model 1 has three retained classifylng variables, MC, TI, and T2, all significant at the 0.05 level. The other four variables, TA, OCF, G, and T3, not significant at the 0.15 level, were excluded by the stepwise procedure. In Model 2, besides MC, T l , and T2, TA was retained as a classifylng variable. The other three variables, G, OCF, and T3, were excluded for not meeting the a = 0.15 requirement. In Model 2, while MC is significant at the 0.001 level and TA, s i e c a n t at the 0.1 level, T1 and T2 are not sigruhcant at the 0.1 level. They were retained in the model because of the a = 0.15 rule. Goldstein and Dillon (1978) suggest that liberal inclusion a levels, between 0.15 and 0.25, should be considered in the discriminant stepwise procedure and the formal probabilistic stopping rules should not be interpreted as stringent tolerances. Rigid stopping rules could significantly reduce the classwng power of a discriminant model. For the &firm sample, an inclusion rule of a = 0.1 would have excluded T1 and T 2 and reduced the D2 to 1.78. The sample and jackknife error rates would have risen to 27.3%.
In comparison with Model 1, Model 2' s higher accuracy does not necessarily mean that it is a superior model. It is not surprising that Model 2 has lower error rates. The strider screening criterion of light and heavy debt users for the &firm sample makes the two groups more distinguishable. Besides, TI and T2, not significant at the 0.1 level, weaken the explanatory power of the model. On the other hand, in the 75-firm sample, the "grey area" of sample firms with DRs around 56 percent makes it hard for Model 1 to discriminate between the two groups. The high error rates of Model 1 are not necessarily indicative of an inferior model. It is not uncommon that discriminant functions with significant D2 have error rates around 25%. For example, the discriminant function of the depression study by Afifi and Clark (1984) has an error rate of 28.9%. The discriminant model for children's riskiness presented by Stevens (1992) has an error rate of 26.3%. Further, all the retained variables in Model 1 are significant at the 0.05 level, making it more convinang when used for explanatory purposes. The higher error rate of Model 1 does not necessarily suggest that Model 1 is an inferior model.
Model accuracy and error rates are not of major interest in this study. This study does not pursue a discriminant model with a minimum error rate. Its purpose is to use the 1 t variables retained in the model to explain the diversity in debt use in the restaurant industry. In particular, the &firm sample is meant for analyzing firms with even wider diversity in debt use-those with DRs greater than 0.67 versus those with DRs less than 0.33 in the restaurant industry, rather than for achieving higher accuracy.
Discussion of the Results
The signs and statistical sigruficance of individual variables of the estimated model deserve attention. Afifi and Clark (1984) point out that for a Fisher discrirninant function, comparisons of the variables that have positive coeffidents with those that have negative coefficients can be revealing. The sign of the coefficient of the Fisher discrirninant 1989-1991 recession. Full-senice upscale restaurant firms were more adversely affected by the recession than other types of restaurants. According to Riehle (1991) , in 1990, this group's operating cash flow was 7.4% of sales revenue, the lowest of all sectors in the industry, whereas its interest expense was 1.2% of sales revenue, the highest of the industry. The recession may have changed the group's financing preference from debt to equity.
Financing theory has suggested that firms exposed to higher business risk may want to use less debt to reduce further exposure to finanaal risk (Weston & Brigham, 1990; Martin et al., 1990; Rao, 1992) . Previous evidence indicates that firms generating stable cash flows over the business cycle tend to have higher debt ratios (Moyer et al., 1990) . Targget (1986) points out that debt-financing proportion and perceived business risk move in opposite directions in the United States. The high likelihood of full-service restaurant firms' being classified as light debt users found in this study suggests that these firms may have higher perceived business risk due to the recession and hence have changed their financing behavior.
The estimated discriminant models show that growth does not play a role in differentiating debt users in the restaurant industry. The findings confirm the results of Titman and Wessels (1988) but negate what was found by Toy Stonehill, Remmers, Wright, and Beekhuisen (1974) . The exclusion of the growth variable from both models suggests that restaurant firms have not wanted to or been able to excessively rely on debt to finance their growth since the 1989-1991 recession. As Wood (1992) points out, many restaurant firms, small ones in particular, have already reached their debt capacity. Increased debt financing for growth may have been matched by new equity issuance and retention, thus making the debt proportion unchanged and the impact of growth on debt ratio insigruficant. In fact, most of the restaurant firms retain their earnings as an internal finanang source. In 1993, of the 75 restaurant firms in the sample, only 15 paid dividends. Most of them were penny dividends.
The exclusion of OCF from the Fisher discriminant models was not a surprise, since there was no significant difference in the mean OCF ratios between different groups of debt users (Tables 3 & 4) . Finance theory has suggested that profitable firms may use less debt because operating cash flow, an internal financing source, can substitute for external borrowing. Previous empirical studies (Toy et al., 1974; 'l3tman & Wessels, 1988) found i profitability negatively related to debt use in manufacturing industries, because a signifii cant gap in operating profits existed and higher operating profits were found in low-debt i firms. In this study the two groups had mean OCF ratios not significantly different from each other. The similarity in their mean OCFs could make the impact of OCF on debt use homogenous and result in its insigruficant role in classifying debt users.
The sigruficant negative relationship between profitability and debt use observed in other industries is not likely to occur in the restaurant industry because of its fast growth. The 75 restaurant firms had an average sales growth of 25.4% from 1991 through 1993, much faster than the nation's GDP growth. Myers (1984) proposes that profitable firms in a slow-growth industry are likely to use less debt because of lower cumulative need for market-value debt ratios, a new discriminant function may provide a better explanation of the diversity of the capital structure in the restaurant industry.
